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RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION IN
ANTITRUST LAW: A PAST WITH
No FUTURE
C. Paul Rogers III*
I. INTRODUCTION
he old common law rule prohibiting restraints on alienation was
soundly discredited as a viable antitrust goal by the Supreme
Court in its watershed Continental T. V. v. GTE Sylvania1 decision
almost twenty years ago. However, early antitrust decisions, some of
which are the cornerstones of modern antitrust law, are liberally sprin-
kled with references to the alienation concept. Indeed, at least one early
landmark decision seems to have rested primarily on a trader's right to
compete free of another's interference.2 Thus, the restraint on alienation
issue is perhaps relevant to modern antitrust jurisprudence, for even if it
is agreed that the alienation concept is an inappropriate antitrust tool, the
fact remains that some existing antitrust law owes allegiance to it.
3
In the antitrust arena, freedom from a restraint on alienation refers to
the right of an owner of goods to make decisions in the marketplace free
from the interference of others. For example, a resale price maintenance
agreement between manufacturer and wholesaler would restrict the right
of alienation of the wholesaler, since the wholesaler would not be free
under the agreement to set his own resale price for his goods. Such an
agreement would constitute a restraint on alienation.
The alienation concept is anathema to efficiency concerns, since it
causes manufacturers to lose all control over their goods immediately
* Dean and Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law. B.A.
1970, J.D. 1973, University of Texas; LL.M. 1977, Columbia University. Although this arti-
cle may not be worthy of the memory of Ken Pye, I very much wanted it included in this
volume in his honor. Ken provided me a summer grant to support the research for this
piece shortly after he assumed the SMU presidency. That August, I became a full-time
university administrator, and despite the best of intentions, the article lay in the drawer
(actually in the computer) until prompted to completion by my desire to contribute to this
volume. I would like to acknowledge the fine research of two former students, Leslie
Klaassen and Bruce Reemsnyder, and, more recently, the assistance of Greg Ivy of the
Underwood Law Library.
1. 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977).
2. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 409 (1911).
3. For an analysis that argues that the congressional debates leading to the passage of
the Sherman Act and early antitrust law generally exhibit a conflict between fostering com-
petition and the protection of property rights, see Rudolph J. Peritz, The "Rule of Reason"
in Antitrust Law: Property Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 285 (1989).
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upon sale. Of course, a restraint on alienation may occur in a situation in
which a manufacturer has dominant market power and is exercising it in a
way so as to assure distributional control over its goods to the detriment
of competition in the market. But the alienation concept, in its simplest
marketplace form, protects the opportunity of one to compete rather
than protecting competition itself or consumer welfare.
4
The Supreme Court's decision in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp.5 suggests that protection of restraints against alienation
cannot be considered completely obsolete in the vertical restraints arena.
In that case, the Court held that a vertical restraint is not illegal per se
unless it contains an agreement on price or price levels.6 In distinguishing
the per se rule for resale price maintenance established long ago in Dr.
Miles, the Sharp Electronics majority acknowledged the common law
property underpinnings of that early decision. 7 Thus, it may be asked
whether restraint on alienation is still a factor to be reckoned with in the
modern antitrust world.
This article will attempt to measure the historical significance of re-
straints on alienation in the development of important antitrust doctrines
such as resale price maintenance. It will then evaluate the contemporary
role of alienation concepts in antitrust today and consider whether aliena-
tiQn as an antitrust goal should once and for all be discarded as anti-
efficient and anti-consumer. Finally, the article will analyze the effect of
changing alienation-influenced antitrust doctrine or removing it from cur-
rent antitrust law.
II. THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ALIENATION
At common law, alienation refers to the voluntary transfer of the title
of property by the owner to another. 8 Thus, a restraint on alienability
simply refers to some type of restriction on the salability or transferability
of property. The common law, both in England and the United States,
has traditionally favored the free alienation or transferability of property
and looked askance at restrictions on alienation, particularly if privately
imposed. 9 Restraints upon alienation are typically permitted only for ar-
ticulated public policy reasons, for general public policy strongly favors
4. Although it might be preferable from a consumer welfare perspective that the
manufacturer control the price and other distributional facets of marketing a product, an
alienation approach would intercede on behalf of the independence of the middleman.
5. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
6. Id. at 735-36.
7. Id. at 733. The Court went on to rule that the per se rule articulated in Dr. Miles
did not apply to the facts before it since "no agreement on resale price or price level, and
hence no restraint on alienation, was found by the jury." Id.
8. See, e.g., Rathbun v. Allen, 7 A.2d 273,275 (R.I. 1939); Delfelder v. Poston, 293 P.
354, 359 (Wyo. 1930); Rich v. Doneghey, 177 P. 86, 89 (Okla. 1918).




the free alienation of property.10
Historically, restraints on alienation of personalty as well as real prop-
erty were objectionable. 1' Lord Coke viewed both as anathema to public
policy, as set forth in the following oft-quoted passage:
If a man be possessed of a horse or any other chattel real or per-
sonal, and give his whole interest or property therein, upon condition
that the donee or vendee shall not alien the same, the same is void,
because the whole interest and property is out of him, so as he hath
no possibility of reverter; and it is against trade and traffic and bar-
gaining and contracting between man and man.
12
Coke's reference to "trade and traffic" was apparently influential in
heightening awareness of the importance of the alienability of chattels.
By the turn of this century, English and American courts, although per-
haps not solely because of Lord Coke, were treating restraints on aliena-
tion of movables under the "restraint of trade" rubric. English courts
used, in cryptic language, the right of alienation to strike down resale
price maintenance agreements. 13 At the same time American courts, in-
cluding the Supreme Court, were following suit.
III. THE EARLY AMERICAN PATENT CASES
The earliest restraint of trade cases utilizing restraint of alienation rea-
soning in America involved patents. The first cases did not involve the
patent holder's right to control price after sale of the patented product,
but rather concerned the patent holder's right to control the use of the
article after sale or transfer. The cases typically involved an attempt by
the patent holder to impose a time limit on the use of the patented article
by the purchaser.
In Bloomer v. McQuewan,'4 Chief Justice Taney distinguished between
10. Id. at 2-6; see also John D. Park & Sons v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907)
("The right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of general property in
movables, and restraints upon alienation have been generally regarded as obnoxious to
public policy, which is best subserved by great freedom of traffic in such things as pass from
hand to hand.").
11. Restraints on the alienation of real property were more frequently permitted and
generally less objectionable in England than restraints on movables. See, e.g., Tulk v.
Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774, 779, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (P.C. 1848) (holding that equity would permit
an injunction to enforce a negative covenant where the subsequent purchaser took with
notice); cf. National Phonograph Co. v. Menck, 1911 App. Cas. 336 (P.C. 1910) (appeal
taken from Austl.); McGruther v. Pitcher, [1904] 2 Ch. 306 (Eng. C.A. 1904); Taddy & Co.
v. Sterious & Co., [19041 1 Ch. 354 (Eng. 1903); Bagot Pneumatic lyre Co. v. Clipper
Pneumatic TIyre Co., [1902] 1 Ch. 146 (Eng. C.A. 1901). See also Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945, 977-80 (1928).
12. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 360 (Day ed. 1812). There is some
suggestion in England that the alienability of real property was originally viewed as less
important than the alienability of chattels. See Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72, 74 (K.B.
1583).
13. See Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge & Co., 1915 App. Cas. 847 (1915)
(appeal taken from Eng.); Gillette Safety Razor Co. v. A. W. Gamage Ltd., 25 T.L.R. 808
(1909); National Phonograph, 1911 App. Cas. at 336; McGruther, [1904] 2 Ch. at 306;
Taddy, [1904] 1 Ch. at 354.
14. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852).
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a grant by the patent holder of the right to make and sell the product and
the grant of the right to use it.'5 According to the Court, the right to
make or vend a patented good derives directly from the monopoly con-
ferred by statute, and thus can be limited by the patent holder even
where Congress has extended the monopoly period conferred. However,
the Court found that the purchaser who intends merely to use the article
is not exercising any patent-derived rights; "[t]he implement or machine
becomes his private, individual property,. . . protected by ... the laws of
the State in which it is situated."'16 The Court concluded that "it can
hardly be maintained that Congress could lawfully deprive a citizen of the
use of his property after he had purchased the absolute and unlimited
right from the inventor.'
17
Subsequently, in Mitchell v. Hawley,18 the Supreme Court was con-
fronted with a conditioned sale, in contrast to the unconditioned sale in
Bloomer. The Court upheld a condition in the original agreement which
limited the purchaser's right to sell or use the patented article to the origi-
nal term of the patent grant, even though Congress had later extended
the patent term.' 9 Next, in Adams v. Burke,20 the Court considered the
right of a patent holder to control subsequent purchasers' actions with
respect to the patented article. The dispute involved an undertaker who
had purchased patented coffin lids from licensed manufacturers having
the right to make, use, and sell the product only within a ten-mile radius
of Boston. An injunction was sought to preclude the undertaker from
using the lids outside of the radius. The Court, citing both Bloomer and
Mitchell,2 ' upheld the right of the subsequent purchaser to use the pat-
ented lids beyond the radius.22 "[I]n the essential nature of things," ac-
cording to the Court, "when the patentee . . . sells a machine or
instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the consideration for
its use and he parts with the right to restrict that use."
'23
Adams made clear that an agreement between a patentee (or his as-
signee) and a manufacturer could not bind a subsequent purchaser for
use. Thus, after Bloomer, Mitchell, and Adams, it appeared that a patent
holder could control use of the patented article only by placing conditions
15. Id. at 549. This distinction was first made in Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.)
646, 688 (1846). See also Chaffee v. Boston Belting Co., 63 U.S. (22 How.) 217, 223 (1859).
16. Bloomer, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 550. Taney also wrote that "when the machine
passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly. It
passes outside of it ..... Id. at 549.
17. Id. at 553.
18. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544 (1872).
19. Id. at 550-51.
20. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873).
21. Id. at 456 n.*.
22. Id. at 456.
23. Id. The Court went on to say:
[T]he patentee or his assignee having in the act of sale received all the roy-
alty or consideration which he claims for the use of his invention in that par-
ticular machine or instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser without
further restriction on account of the monopoly of the patentees.
[Vol. 49
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on the purchaser at the time of sale; even that, however, could not bind a
subsequent use purchaser. But later decisions, beginning with Peninsular
Button-Fastener,24 expanded the patentee's control of both the use and
resale of patented articles. In that case, the Sixth Circuit held that a no-
tice of conditions of use permanently and conspicuously affixed to a pat-
ented article was sufficient to bind a purchaser to those conditions.
25 This
type of notice was also found to be effective against subsequent purchas-
ers who bought the patented machines from jobbers.26 Even more signif-
icantly, the court held that a patentee's enforceable conditions of use
could extend to articles beyond the coverage of the patent. Thus, a pat-
entee could lawfully tie the use of a non-patented product, typically also
produced by the patentee, to the use of the patented product.
27
Subsequent decisions upheld the right of patent holders to control the
terms of resale, including price, of patented goods. 28 In Victor Talking
Machine Co. v. The Fair,29 the Seventh Circuit upheld the right of a pat-
ent holder to control the resale price of its patented article, even against a
subsequent purchaser from a jobber, where the subsequent purchaser was
aware of the price limitations placed upon the jobber.30 Two Supreme
Court decisions confirmed that the patentee's monopoly rights extended
to the control of the terms of sale or resale of the patented product.
31
These cases granting patentees preferred positions, although later re-
stricted 32 and, in the case of Henry, overruled,33 were unsuccessfully re-
lied upon to support resale price agreements in non-patent transactions.
The Supreme Court rejected the analogy to patents in a copyright case,
holding that a copyright holder does not have the right to impose a price
limitation upon future purchasers as to the retail sale of a copyrighted
book.34 It can be said that the lack of a patent relationship is one of the
principal reasons that resale price maintenance was found to violate the
Sherman Act in the seminal Dr. Miles decision 35 and its closely related
24. Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (6th
Cir. 1896).
25. Id. at 290-91.
26. Id. at 291.
27. Id. at 294-96. The Supreme Court later soundly rejected this principle in the Inter-
national Salt case. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947).
28. National Phonograph Co. v. Schlegel, 128 F. 733, 736 (8th Cir. 1904); Edison Pho-
nograph Co. v. Pike, 116 F. 863 (C.C.D. Mass. 1902); Edison Phonograph Co. v. Kaufmann,
105 F. 960, 960 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1901).
29. 123 F. 424 (7th Cir. 1903).
30. Id. at 427. It was this case in which Judge Baker penned the oft-quoted phrase,
"Within his domain, the patentee is czar." Id at 426.
31. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912); Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186
U.S. 70 (1902).
32. See Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918); Straus v.
Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917); Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1
(1913).
33. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517-18
(1917).
34. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908).
35. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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predecessor, John D. Park & Sons v. Hartman.36
The early patent and copyright opinions focus on the intent and reach
of the Congressional grant of monopoly; the right of a user to control the
use or resale of the article seems to be assumed if the statutory authoriza-
tion falls short. However, those decisions are not noted for their elabora-
tion of alienation principles. It is necessary to look at the non-patent and
non-copyright cases to gain insight into the judiciary's early view of the
alienability of chattels.
IV. ALIENATION IN NON-PATENT CASES
The early cases, in applying the common law, treated restraints on the
alienation of chattels as restraints of trade. For example, in Fowle v.
Park,37 the Supreme Court upheld an agreement restricting the territory
in which a licensee could sell a secret formula medicine. The Court found
the territorial restriction justified under the reasonableness standard em-
ployed in the historic English case, Mitchel v. Reynolds.38 According to
the Court, vendors are "entitled to sell to the best advantage, and in do-
ing so to exercise the right to preclude themselves from entering into
competition with those who purchased, and to prevent competition be-
tween purchasers; and the purchasers were entitled to such protection as
was reasonably necessary for their benefit."'39 The Court's approval of
the restraint was consistent with the policy of encouraging "useful discov-
eries" by granting rights to those who make discoveries; further, the pub-
lic was not harmed by the restriction since its only interest was the
availability of the balm, not the identity of the seller.40
Thus, the alienation rights of licensees of the secret formula were given
short shrift in Fowle. The case was decided one year prior to the passage
of the Sherman Act, however, and resale price maintenance was not di-
rectly at issue.41 Subsequently, in Garst v. Harris,42 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts did uphold resale price maintenance agreements,
although the court later balked at extending the protection to subsequent
purchasers who had not entered into an agreement with the original ven-
dor.43 The court's reasoning in the former decision centered upon con-
tract law and the superior rights afforded secret formula product
36. 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907). Judge Lurton, who had authored Heaton-Peninsular
Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288 (6th Cir. 1896), see supra text
accompanying notes 24-27, wrote both opinions at the appellate level, striking down resale
price maintenance agreements in non-patent contexts. See also Edward H. Levi, The
Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban on Resale Price Maintenance, 1960 Sup. Cr. REv.
258, 270-71.
37. 131 U.S. 88 (1888).
38. 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (B.R. 1711).
39. 131 U.S. at 97.
40. Id.
41. The agreement did contain a resale price minimum, but apparently that restriction
was not litigated. Id. at 94.
42. 58 N.E. 174 (Mass. 1900); see also Garst v. Charles, 72 N.E. 839 (Mass. 1905).
43. Garst v. Hall & Lyon Co., 61 N.E. 219 (Mass. 1901).
[Vol. 49
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developers, at least as against purchasers who intended to resell the prod-
uct. The later Hall & Lyon decision viewed Harris "as founded on the
personal contract alone.""4 According to the court, "[t]o say that this
contract is attached to the property, and follows it through successive
sales which severally pass title, is a very different proposition. We know
of no authority, not of any sound principle, which will justify us in so
holding."-45
The Massachusetts decisions reflect the continuing conflict between
alienation and patent law principles. Even absent a patent, the courts
tended to grant some measure of marketing protection to the maker of a
secret process. Beyond the privity of a contract entered into by the pro-
cess developer, in Massachusetts at least, alienation principles took prece-
dence. Those principles recognize that movement in chattels should not
be restrained and that subsequent purchasers should have the right to
dispose of their property without encumbrance. 46
V. JOHN D. PARK & SONS v. HARTMAN
The application of patent law principles to the distribution of products
made from non-patented secret processes was thoroughly debunked by
the Sixth Circuit in the Hartman case. 47 The decision is important be-
cause it was the first resale price maintenance case to rest unabashedly
upon alienation principles.
Hartman involved a challenge to a drug manufacturer that required its
wholesalers to agree to sell only to specified retailers and at specified
prices.48 The manufacturer had sought an injunction against an author-
ized distributor who was price cutting and selling the plaintiff's goods to
unauthorized retailers. Judge Lurton, who had authored the Peninsular
Button-Fastener opinion that had expanded a patentee's rights to control
a patented article's distribution,49 believed that a patentee's rights de-
rived from its congressionally sanctioned monopoly. Since secret process
manufacturers could look to no statute granting similar rights, resort to
common law restraint of trade principles became necessary. 5
0
In applying the common law, the court first looked directly to aliena-
tion principles. In its view, "[t]he right of alienation is one of the essen-
tial incidents of a right of general property in movables, and restraints
upon alienation have been generally regarded as obnoxious to public pol-
icy, which is best subserved by great freedom of traffic in such things as
44. Id.
45. Id. at 219-20.
46. The court in Hall & Lyon ruled that "[t]he purchaser from a purchaser has an
absolute right to dispose of the property." Id. at 219.
47. John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907).
48. The manufacturer actually sought injunctive relief against the defendant who was
surreptitiously obtaining the manufacturer's drugs and selling them at discount prices. Id.
at 24-25.
49. Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (6th
Cir. 1896); see supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
50. Hartman, 153 F. at 27-35.
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pass from hand to hand. ' 51 The court concluded that a price and cus-
tomer restriction intended to bind even those not in a contractual rela-
tionship with the manufacturer did amount to a restraint on alienation. 52
The court then proceeded to consider whether the restraint on aliena-
tion was authorized to protect the interests of the manufacturer selling its
goods. It held that only if the restraint was ancillary to some lawful main
contractual purpose could it withstand scrutiny. 53 The court concluded
that, particularly given the large number of restrictive contracts entered
into by the plaintiff, the main purpose and the sole effect of the agree-
ments were to stifle trade at the wholesale and retail levels.54
VI. DR. MILES MEDICAL CO. V. JOHN D. PARK & SONS
The Hartman result and reasoning were heartily embraced by the
Supreme Court in the landmark Dr. Miles decision. 55 The plaintiff in Dr.
Miles was a drug manufacturer who brought a tortious interference action
against a wholesale drug concern that was procuring plaintiff's products
and selling them at "cut prices."'56 The defendant had refused to enter
into a resale price maintenance agreement with the plaintiff and was al-
legedly inducing those who had done so to violate their price restric-
51. Id. at 39.
52. Id. at 40-41. Since there was no contractual relationship between the manufacturer
and the defendant, no breach of contract action could lie. Thus, the manufacturer's claim
for injunctive relief against the defendant was conditioned upon it having the right to con-
trol the terms on all sales of its products.
In defining alienation, the Hartman court quoted Lord Coke, see supra note 12 and
accompanying text, and went on to say:
It is also a general rule of the common law that a contract restricting the use
or controlling subsales cannot be annexed to a chattel so as to follow the
article and obligate the subpurchaser by operation of notice. A covenant
which may be valid and run with land will not run with or attach itself to a
mere chattel.
153 F. at 39 (citations omitted).
53. The court was relying on an earlier statement of the common law standard set
forth in United States v. Addyston Pipe Co., 85 Fed. 271,281 (6th Cir. 1898). The Hartman
court went on to set forth those circumstances in which a restraint might be found
ancillary:
A partial restraint of competition may be upheld when one sells a business or
other property, provided it is no greater than necessary to enable the vendor
to realize the value of his good will or to secure to the buyer the enjoyment
of his purchase, or to prevent the use of the property to the prejudice of the
seller .... Covenants protecting the seller of property against the competi-
tion of the buyer, by its use against the business retained by the seller ... are
upheld if not wider than necessary for that purpose.
Hartman, 153 F. at 44-45.
54. Hartman, 153 F. at 42. The court was at a loss to see how the suppression of
competition between the plaintiff's vendees and subvendees could secure plaintiff "the en-
joyment of the legitimate fruits of his contracts of sale." Id. at 44.
55. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parks & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Dr. Miles
arose from the Sixth Circuit, where Judge Lurton characterized the case as being con-
trolled by Hartman. 164 F. 803, 804-07 (6th Cir. 1908).
56. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 375.
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tions.57 The plaintiff, in an effort to avoid the Hartman precedent,
consigned rather than sold its drugs to its authorized distributors. It still
required, however, a resale price maintenance agreement of its wholesal-
ers and retailers. In addition, the contracts were held to apply to the
plaintiff's goods which were obtained by distributors or retailers from
other sources.58
Chief Justice Hughes relied on the findings of the court below in con-
sidering the ownership issue. There, Judge Lurton had found the con-
signment agreements an effort "to disguise the wholesale dealers in the
mask of agency" and had concluded that "the jobber must be regarded as
the general owner and engaged in selling for himself."'59 The Court went
on to rule that the dealer acquired title to the goods, irrespective of the
enforceability of the agency and consignment agreements, because of in-
consistencies in Dr. Miles' pleadings. Dr. Miles had failed to aver that
the distributor acquired the patented medicine from a consignee, so the
Court could not support Dr. Miles' claim that it retained title to the goods
at issue.
60
The Supreme Court then followed the Hartman reasoning closely in
condemning the practice in question as violative of the Sherman Act.61
In addition, it quoted extensively from Hartman on the alienation issue.62
The Court, per Justice Hughes, 63 rejected the assertion that a manufac-
turer is entitled to control prices on subsequent sales of its products.
"[B]ecause a manufacturer is not bound to make or sell, it does not fol-
low that in case of sales actually made he may impose upon purchasers
every sort of restriction. Thus, a general restraint upon alienation is ordi-
narily invalid." 64
The Dr. Miles Court, as had the Sixth Circuit in Hartman, next consid-
ered whether the restraint on alienation amounted to a restraint of trade
or was reasonably necessary to protect legitimate interests of the manu-
facturer. It concluded that a resale price maintenance agreement was
"not analogous to that of a sale of good will, or of an interest in business,
or of the grant of a right to use a process of manufacture;" that the manu-
facturer had "not parted with any interest in its business or instrumentali-
ties of production;" and that it had "conferred no right by virtue of which
purchasers of its products may compete with it. ''65 The Court concluded
57. Plaintiff, in an effort to exact maximum control over the price and distribution of
its products, entered into consignment contracts with wholesalers and "retail agency con-
tracts" with retailers, both of which required the maintenance of resale prices. Id. at 394.
58. Id. at 410 (Holmes, J. dissenting).
59. Id. at 395 (quoting Dr. Miles, 164 F. at 805).
60. Id. at 397-99; see Rudolph J. Peritz, A Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 40
HAS-MNGS L.J. 511, 518-519 (1989).
61. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
62. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 405-06.
63. Judge Lurton, author of the Peninsular Button-Fastener, Hartman, and lower court
Dr. Miles opinions, had been appointed to the Supreme Court by the time that Court
heard the Dr. Miles appeal. He did not participate in the decision. Id. at 409.
64. Id. at 404.
65. Id. at 407.
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that a restraint of trade resulted because the resale price agreements pre-
vented competition among the product's distributors.66
While Dr. Miles came before the articulation of per se rules, the
Court's abrupt rejection of the proffered justifications led to its classifica-
tion as a per se decision in later Supreme Court decisions.67 The aliena-
tion issue plays a prominent part in the decision; it appears that the Court
believed that a finding of a restraint on alienation was a necessary predi-
cate to its restraint of trade determination. The Court based the latter
finding on the elimination of competition among dealers who would
otherwise be competing for Dr. Miles' products.68 The Court's point
seems to be that a dealer cannot effectively compete with its rivals unless
it has the right of alienation of its own goods. The Court recognized price
and other restrictions hamper competition at each level of distribution;
that is, vertical restraints have horizontal competitive effects.69 In fact, it
specifically equated the effect of Dr. Miles' resale price agreements with a
conspiracy between dealers to set prices among themselves.70
It is noteworthy that the alienation concept in Dr. Miles was discussed
both with respect to the importance of the movability of chattels and with
regard to the freedom of dealers to control the distribution of their prod-
ucts. 71 Historically, the consideration of alienation has brought about a
public policy focus on the importance of movement in chattels to com-
66. Id. This was particularly true, according to the Court, given the large number of
agreements containing the price restrictions. Id. at 407. Dr. Miles apparently had con-
tracts with over 400 wholesalers and 25,000 retailers. See William R. Andersen, The Anti-
trust Consequences of Manufacturer-Suggested Retail Prices-The Case for Presumptive
Illegality, 54 WASH. L. REv. 763, 768 (1979).
Justice Holmes vigorously dissented. He believed that a manufacturer should have the
right to control the price of its products. He believed that "we greatly exaggerate the value
and importance to the public of competition in the production or distribution of an article
... as fixing a fair price." Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 412. According to Holmes, a fair price to
consumers will be assured by the "equilibrium of social desires," meaning that consumers
will refuse to pay more than their wants mandate for products such as Dr. Miles' drugs. Id.
Holmes viewed the defendant's price cutting as "fraudulent," with "no merits of its own to
recommend it to the favor of the court." Id. He wrote:
I cannot believe that in the long run the public will profit by this court per-
mitting knaves to cut reasonable prices for some ulterior purpose of their
own and thus to impair, if not to destroy, the production and sale of articles
which it is assumed to be desirable that the public should be able to get.
Id. As will be seen, this view is closely akin to modem objections to "free riders" and to
the implicit support a right of alienation approach provides such price-cutting "knaves."
67. "[V]ertical agreements on resale prices have been illegal per se since Dr. Miles."
Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988); see also Monsanto Co.
v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 760 (1984); United States v. McKesson & Robbins,
Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 310 (1956); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 307 (1948).
68. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 407-08.
69. Id. at 408.
70. Id.
71. On the latter point the Court stated: "If there be an advantage to a manufacturer
in the maintenance of fixed retail prices, the question remains whether it is one which he is
entitled to secure by agreements restricting the freedom of trade on the part of dealers who
own what they sell." Id. at 407-08. The Court concluded that the manufacturer was not so
entitled. Itd at 408.
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merce. 72 Dr. Miles, again following the lead established by Hartman,
looked to the effects restraints on alienation have upon competitors and
competition. It is, of course, this interposition of the right of alienation
into the competitive sphere that has proven so controversial.
VII. UNITED STATES V. COLGATE & CO.
Following Dr. Miles, it appeared that a manufacturer could not control
the resale prices of its products absent, as Justice Holmes noted in his
dissent, downstream integration.73 The Supreme Court extended this
principle to the patent cases, holding that a patentee has no right to con-
trol the resale price of a patented article once it has sold and received
consideration for the article.74 However, in the controversial Colgate
case, the Supreme Court gave manufacturers and suppliers hope for some
control over the distribution of their products.75
Colgate was a criminal case in which the government charged the de-
fendant with orchestrating a conspiracy with wholesale and retail dealers
for the purpose of maintaining resale prices. To defend itself, Colgate
went so far as to retain Charles Evan Hughes, who had resigned from the
Supreme Court a few years before, to represent it.76 The district court
gave Hughes something to work with when it ruled that the indictment
did not charge that the defendant had secured agreements or contracts
with its distributors to secure resale prices. 77 Subsequently, the Supreme
Court believed that it was bound by that interpretation.
78
Therein lay a distinction from Dr. Miles with which the Court could
feel comfortable. Faced with the ongoing conflict over the control of
goods between manufacturers and distributors, the Court found reason
on this occasion to side with the manufacturers. Accordingly, the Court
held that
[i]n the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,
the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manu-
facturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his
own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal;
and, of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under
which he will refuse to sell.
79
72. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
73. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 411 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
74. Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918); see also Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
75. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
76. Hughes was, of course, the author of the Dr. Miles opinion. According to Chafee,
Hughes "piloted the battered hulks of price maintenance up a tortuous channel between
the familiar rocks and shoals presented by his former colleagues, into safe anchorage."
Chafee, supra note 11, at 990.
77. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 304.
78. I at 306-07.
79. Id. at 307. The Court's monopolization exception was, of course, in deference to
§ 2 of the Sherman Act.
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In sum, the Court ruled that absent an agreement to control resale prices,
the manufacturer has a chance to actually control resale prices. A manu-
facturer could announce the terms on which it would sell its products,
including resale prices, as long as it did not require an agreement of its
distributors; further, it could refuse to sell to those not adhering to its
resale prices.
Hughes had argued that the lack of an agreement eliminated restraint
on alienation difficulties because there was no qualification of a buyer's
title or of his freedom to resell.80 He distinguished Dr. Miles as involving
"the restraint upon the right of alienation of property sold, not the right
of the manufacturer to refuse to sell."'81 The Court did not directly ad-
dress alienation, although in giving manufacturers the latitude that it did,
it seemed to agree with Hughes' characterization of the issue. It did spe-
cifically distinguish Dr. Miles on the basis of the resale price agreements
there present.82
In affirming "the long recognized right" of a producer to independently
refuse to deal with anyone it finds objectionable,8 3 the Court relied prin-
cipally on two earlier Sherman Act cases, Trans-Missouri8 4 and Eastern
States Retail Lumber.8 5 Those cases both involved horizontal conspira-
cies to, respectively, fix railroad freight rates and exclude retail lumber
competitors. The Court's reference to independent action in Trans-Mis-
souri was to contrast private manufacturers, who are free to sell to any-
one, from a railroad, which, the Court said, "must transport all persons
and property that come to it.'' 86 In Eastern States Retail Lumber, the
Court distinguished between the right of a retailer to refuse to purchase
from a wholesaler and a retailer conspiracy to the same effect.8 7 Thus,
the Colgate Court, in acknowledging the manufacturers' autonomy as it
did, put forth the refusal to deal "right" in a new, vertical context. In
doing so, the Court gave manufacturers significant resale control over
their products, although subsequent decisions would curtail many of the
routes manufacturers thought open to them.88
80. See Levi, supra note 36, at 276-77 (citing Brief for Defendant-in-Error at 12); Col-
gate, 250 U.S. at 300.
81. Levi, supra note 36, at 277 (quoting Charles E. Hughes).
82. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307-08.
83. Id. at 307.
84. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
85. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
86. Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 321. Moreover, the railroad must, according to the
Court, "do so at the same price for the same service, and the price must be reasonable, and
it cannot at its will discontinue its business." Id.
87. 234 U.S. at 614. The Colgate Court also cited two consolidation cases, Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 56 (1911), and United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
221 U.S. 106, 180 (1911), and one of the cases which significantly limited patentees' rights
to control the distribution of patented articles, Boston Store v. American Graphophone
Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); FTC v. Beech-
Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S.
208 (1921); United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920). The subsequent
erosion of Colgate may have been due to its somewhat unique posture. The Court's hold-
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As noted, in granting the manufacturers control over resale absent an
agreement the Colgate Court did not directly address alienation, arguably
because it agreed with Hughes that no restraint existed. But Dr. Miles'
emphasis on the freedom of traders to exercise unfettered control over
their goods certainly squares philosophically with Colgate's recognition of
manufacturer resale control. Indeed, the tension between Dr. Miles and
Colgate, and their resolution of the conflict between manufacturers and
distributors, can perhaps best be understood by resort to the alienation
principle articulated in Dr. Miles (which was borrowed from Hartman).89
If alienation recognizes the freedom of dealers to control distribution of
their products, it must also support the right of manufacturers to do the
same. Since an obvious conflict occurs when both manufacturer and
dealer seek to assert that right, at least where the manufacturer is at-
tempting to control the terms of resale, some middle ground must be
reached. Colgate expressly recognized the manufacturer's side of the
conflict and effected a compromise between the competing interests by
focusing on the presence or absence of an agreement forcing the manu-
facturer's desires on the distributor.
It remains to consider the competitive impact of the compromise. The
Dr. Miles Court likened the effect of the resale price agreements to a
conspiracy among dealers to set prices;90 today we would point to the
elimination of intrabrand competition among the participating dealers. 91
Certainly, the same competitive effect results in the Colgate situation, at
least to the extent that the manufacturer is successful in imposing its
desires upon distributors absent an agreement. The greater the manufac-
turer's success, the greater the interference with intrabrand
competition.92
ing can be reduced to the proposition that, if an indictment does not charge an agreement,
it is subject to demurrer. The Court there did not consider whether Colgate's conduct in its
dealings with its distributors met the conspiracy requirement of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
Under subsequently developed inferential conspiracy doctrine and later resale price and"Colgate" cases, it assuredly would have. See cases cited above and Interstate Circuit, Inc.
v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
89. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
90. 220 U.S. at 407-08.
91. A price-fixing conspiracy among dealers of the same brand product has the effect
of eliminating intrabrand competition just as if the resale price were mandated by the
supplier.
The competitive impact on the market caused by the elimination of intrabrand competi-
tion through resale price maintenance depends upon the percentage of the market con-
trolled by the product and the percentage of the manufacturer's product subject to the
resale prices. Even assuming that a manufacturer is successful in mandating resale prices
for all of a product distributed, the elimination of competition on the market as a whole is
insignificant unless that product controls a substantial market share.
For non-price vertical restraints, the elimination of intrabrand competition is balanced,
under the rule of reason, against the distributional efficiency gains which may result from
the restrictions (thus promoting interbrand competition). Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). But no such balancing can take place for resale price
maintenance, assuming distributional efficiencies there are at least theoretically possible,
because of the continuing existence of the per se rule.
92. The effect of a manufacturer's refusal to deal similarly with price-cutting distribu-
tors is to impede intrabrand competition, since the distributor is unable to obtain the de-
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Thus, Colgate permits an anticompetitive effect expressly forbidden in
Dr. Miles. If, as suggested above, the result in Colgate represents a com-
promise of the conflict between manufacturers and distributors and an
implicit recognition of alienation principles, it still seems to be at the ex-
pense of intrabrand competition. That competitive permissiveness is un-
doubtedly one reason subsequent Supreme Court opinions, at least until
recently when new thinking about the economic impact of vertical re-
straints influenced the Court,93 narrowly confined Colgate.94
The absence of an allegation of an express agreement in Colgate also
appears to have been somewhat of a subterfuge. Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act, of course, forbids "contract[s], combination[s] ...or con-
spirac[ies]"; 95 and at the time of the decision, the finding of inferential
conspiracies in other cases had already occurred.96 However, the Colgate
Court elected not to consider whether the indictment charged such a con-
spiracy, instead referring to the right of manufacturers to control the sale
of their products.
VIII. POST-COLGATE DECISIONS
In post-Colgate decisions, the Supreme Court set about defining the
reach of both Colgate and Dr. Miles. In United States v. A. Schrader's
Son, Inc.,97 the Court reaffirmed that Colgate did not implicitly overrule
or erode Dr. Miles and ruled that the Dr. Miles prohibition applied to
resale price agreements "whether express or implied from a course of
dealing or other circumstances. '' 98 The next term, in Frey & Son, Inc. v.
Cudahy Packing Co. ,99 the Court held that the existence of an express or
implied agreement was a question of fact for the jury.100
The following year, the Court, in FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.,1°1
struck down a resale pricing scheme in which the defendant solicited from
complying distributors the names of recalcitrant wholesalers and kept a
list of the offenders. In addition, the defendant exercised pressure to
keep complying distributors from selling to noncompliers. Noncompliers
had to provide assurance that they would follow the defendant's resale
pricing policy in order to get off the list and obtain the defendant's
products.
sired product from its principal source. The distributor is thus excluded from the resale
market (except to the extent it is able to obtain the product from other sources) and from
providing intrabrand competition.
93. See Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Monsanto Co.
v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
94. See infra text accompanying notes 97-117.
95. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
96. See, e.g., Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S.
600 (1914).
97. 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
98. Id. at 99.
99. 256 U.S. 208 (1921).
100. Id. at 210.
101. 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
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In drawing the line between Dr. Miles and Colgate, the Court held that
the Beech-Nut system went "far beyond the simple refusal to sell goods
to persons who will not sell at stated prices."'10 2 Its language seems to
dispense with the contract "express or implied" requirement, focusing in-
stead on the anticompetitive impact of defendant's scheme.' 0 3 In so do-
ing, the majority lost the vote of Justice McReynolds, who had authored
the Schrader's Sons and Frey opinions. McReynolds argued that the lack
of agreement, which was stipulated by the parties, meant that the defend-
ant's actions were protected by Colgate.'°4
The Beech-Nut decision certainly seemed to constrict the reach of Col-
gate to simple, uncomplicated unilateral refusals to deal. The Court
rested its tight-line drawing around Colgate, however, on pure competi-
tive principles rather than restraint on alienation notions. Thus, immedi-
ately after Colgate, the proscription against resale price maintenance
broadened considerably on competitive grounds rather than property
rights.
TWenty-two years later, in United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical
Co.,105 the Supreme Court again strictly construed the reach of Colgate.
In Bausch & Lomb, the Court struck down a resale price plan in which
wholesalers cooperated by more than mere acquiescence to the resale
price. 106 By cooperating in resale prices and limiting sales only to ap-
proved retailers, the defendant crossed the Colgate line. According to the
Court, "[w]hether this conspiracy and combination was achieved by
agreement or by acquiescence of the wholesalers coupled with assistance
in effectuating its purpose is immaterial.'
0 7
Alienation principles apparently played no role in the Bausch & Lomb
decision, although its effect was further to curtail the right of a seller of
goods to maintain control over their further disposition. Viewed from the
purchaser's perspective, the post-Colgate cases had seemingly expanded
buyers' rights to resell goods free from interference by a former owner.
The Court next considered the Dr. Miles/Colgate discord in the 1960
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co. decision. 10 8 There, the Court specifi-
cally recognized that the practice allowed in Colgate of a manufacturer
announcing a resale pricing policy, had, if complied with by purchasers,
the same competitive effect as a combination prohibited by Dr. Miles and
its progeny.' 0 9 The Colgate result "is tolerated ... only when it is the
102. Id. at 454.
103. The Court stated that the anticompetitive inference was not overcome by the
FTC's finding of the lack of a contract in the defendant's merchandising conduct. Id. at
455. According to the Court, the "methods in which the company secure[d] the co-opera-
tion of its distributors ... [were] quite as effectual as agreements express or implied in-
tended to accomplish the same purpose." Id.
104. Id. at 458 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
105. 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 723.
108. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
109. Id. at 44.
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consequence of a mere refusal to sell in the exercise of the manufac-
turer's right 'freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to par-
ties with whom he will deal."' 110
The Parke, Davis Court thus exhibited open hostility towards the Col-
gate doctrine and found that the earlier Beech-Nut and Bausch & Lomb
decisions had "narrowly limited Colgate.""' The Court reiterated that
no agreement need be found; if defendant's actions went beyond unilat-
eral action, an unlawful conspiracy would exist."12
Parke, Davis confirmed that the illegality of resale price schemes ex-
tends to the full breadth of Section One's "contract ... combination or
conspiracy" language." 3 But in reaffirming the expanse of Dr. Miles, the
Court again made no mention of alienation principles. Rather, it focused
on competitive impact, declining to overrule Colgate, but limiting its
reach to accommodate only the seller's unilateral right of freedom of
association.
1 4
Eight years after Parke, Davis, the Court expanded the reach of con-
spiracies in the resale price context even farther in Albrecht v. Herald
Co. 1 5 In Albrecht, the Court found an unlawful conspiracy when a news-
paper publisher replaced one of its distributors who was unwilling to ad-
here to a maximum resale price in selling newspapers. No other dealers
complained; the publisher was simply attempting to enforce it pricing pol-
icy. The publisher threatened to deliver the papers itself, hired an agent
to solicit customers away from the recalcitrant dealer, and ultimately en-
gaged another distributor for the plaintiff's route.
The Court, reversing a jury finding and court of appeals affirmance that
the defendant's conduct was unilateral, ruled that a conspiracy existed
between the defendant and both the soliciting agent and the new distribu-
tor. According to the Court, since Parke, Davis recognized a conspiracy
based on the coercion of retailers through the use of complying wholesal-
ers, an agreement could be found through the coercion of enforcing a
pricing policy by the use of an agent to solicit away customers.
116
110. Id. (quoting Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307).
111. Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 42. The Court interpreted Beech-Nut and Bausch &
Lomb as "announc[ing] principles which subject to Sherman Act liability the producer who
secures his customers' adherence to his resale prices by methods which go beyond the
simple refusal to sell to customers who will not resell at stated prices." Id.
112. Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 44. Parke, Davis sought assurances of future compliance
from wholesalers of their resale price plan, furnished the names of offending retailers to
wholesalers, and generally used wholesalers to enforce its retail resale pricing plan, all of
which the Court found beyond the conduct condoned by Colgate. Id. at 45-46.
113. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
114. Justice Harlan led a three-judge dissent, taking umbrage at the majority's use of
"'countervailing' social policies" to limit Colgate. Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 57.
115. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
116. Id at 149-50; see also Edward 0. Correia, Resale Price Maintenance-Searching
for a Policy, 18 J. LEGIS. 187 (1992). The Court also suggested that there might well be a
conspiracy between the defendant and all complying distributors and stated that a claimed
conspiracy between the defendant and the plaintiff's customers was not "frivolous." Al-
brecht, 390 U.S. at 150 n.6.
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Together, the resale price cases after Dr. Miles expand the prohibition
beyond formal contracts or agreements to circumstances involving seller
coercion of purchasers. 117 Although the cases do so without reference to
alienation principles, they have the effect of extending the alienation right
recognized in Dr. Miles to any seller interference with resale beyond a
seller's mere announcement of its resale policy.
If, hypothetically, a seller announces a resale price policy and the pur-
chaser declines to follow it, the seller can discontinue its sales to that
buyer. Since the seller owns the goods yet to be sold and the buyer has
sold the goods it purchased at a price it set, no restraint on alienation has
occurred. But if, in the absence of an agreement with a buyer, a seller
uses coercive tactics or third parties to enforce an announced resale price
policy, a restraint on the alienation of the buyer's goods, purchased from
the seller, has in fact occurred if the buyer goes along. Thus, the develop-
ment of the law against vertical price fixing is, at least through Parke,
Davis, consistent with restraint against alienation notions.
IX. CONSIGNMENTS
In its 1926 decision in United States v. General Electric Co.,118 the
Supreme Court upheld resale price maintenance effectuated through con-
signments.1" 9 According to the Court, the validity of such plans de-
pended "on the question whether the sales are by the company through
its agents to the consumer, or are in fact by the company to the so-called
agents at the time of consignment.'
20
General Electric claimed to retain title until the sale by its agents to its
purchasers and, consistent with its claim, carried insurance, paid taxes,
and assumed the risk of the goods until the sale. Chief Justice Taft could
find no basis for treating the agency contracts as other than consignment
agreements and ruled that "[t]he owner of an article, patented or other-
wise, is not violating the common law, or the Anti-Trust law, by seeking
to dispose of his article directly to the consumer and fixing the price by
which his agents transfer the title from him directly to such consumer.''
Thus, the common law property concepts of title and ownership con-
trolled to permit resale price maintenance through an independent agent
who had no ownership in the goods. General Electric, then, is consistent
with the property logic of Dr. Miles and the unilateral action rationale of
Colgate. But the decision did not do much for competition in the distri-
117. Following the Parke, Davis and Albrecht decisions, many wondered what manufac-
turer conduct could be considered unilateral and whether Colgate retained any practical
value at all. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky & Kenneth W. Dam, Is the Colgate Doctrine Dead?,
37 ANTITRUST L.J. 772 (1968).
118. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
119. General Electric was the owner of three patents on the manufacture of electric
lights and dominated their sales. It sold directly to large consumers and by "direct sales"
of lamps "on consignment" and "negotiated by agents." Id. at 480-81.
120. Id. at 485.
121. Id. at 488.
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bution of electric lights. With General Electric's dominance through it
patents, little interbrand competition existed, and the Court's decision
permitting resale price maintenance ensured the lack of intrabrand
competition.
122
General Electric operated to provide a safe haven for resale price main-
tenance through consignments until the Simpson v. Union Oil Co. deci-
sion almost forty year later. 123 In that case, Simpson, lessee of one of
Union Oil's retail gas stations, complained of resale price maintenance
for gasoline consigned to it by Union for sale to consumers. Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, ruled that, although consignment agree-
ments served useful economic functions, they could not be used to cloak
resale price maintenance agreements from the antitrust laws. 124 Accord-
ing to Douglas, the lease and consignment arrangement coerced dealers
into selling gasoline at noncompetitive prices, in violation of the antitrust
laws. 12
5
Justice Douglas made an unconvincing attempt to distinguish General
Electric by labeling it as a patent case. 126 In fact, the Simpson decision
reflects a 180-degree departure from General Electric.127 It also appears
to be a rejection of the title theory of common law property rights es-
poused so strongly in Dr. Miles, since title no longer controlled the right
to set prices.128 But rather than looking to the impact on intrabrand com-
petition of the practice, the Court instead focused on its coercive nature
and the rights of dealers as independent businessmen to control prices of
goods they sell.
129
In essence, Simpson is akin to the logic of Colgate in the Simpson
Court's recognition that business entities have the right to compete free
from the interference or coercion of others. Noncoercive consignments,
whatever they might be, would presumably be permitted.130 The Simp-
122. See Peritz, supra note 60, at 532.
123. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
124. Id. at 17-18.
125. Id. at 16.
126. Id. at 23.
127. Justice Stewart issued a dissent characterizing the majority's distinction of General
Electric as "specious," asserting that the Court had, in effect, overruled a doctrine that had
stood unquestioned for almost forty years and that the decision would
inject severe uncertainty into commercial relationships established in reli-
ance upon a decision of this Court explicitly validating this method of distri-
bution. We create ... the distinct possibility that an untold number of sellers
of goods will be subjected to liability in treble damage suits because they
thought they could rely on the validity of this Court's decision.
Id. at 30.
Justice Stewart was somewhat prescient. General Electric's consignment system was
ruled per se illegal in a subsequent challenge. United States v. General Elec. Co., 358 F.
Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (patents had expired, thus res judicata was not applicable).
128. Justice Stewart's dissent referred to General Electric in asserting that "control over
price flows from the simple fact that the owner of goods... has the unquestioned right to
determine the price at which he will sell them." Simpson, 377 U.S. at 29.
129. Id. at 20-21. For a ringing criticism of Simpson, see William F. Baxter, The Viabil-
ity of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CAL. L. REv. 933, 935 (1987).
130. See Peritz, supra note 60, at 535.
[Vol. 49
RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION
son decision, however, is vague as to what constitutes coercion and the
court left open the potential for finding any supplier's attempt to impose
prices on a consignee as coercive.
131
The Supreme Court's treatment of vertical price fixing through the use
of consignments reflects anything but a charted course. In Dr. Miles, the
Court found purported consignment agreements to be, in reality, sales.
General Electric extended the Dr. Miles ownership principles to actual
consignment, protecting resale price maintenance. Simpson focused on
the coercive element of consignments and the rights of the dealers to de-
feat the practice there while seemingly jettisoning restraint on alienation
principles.
Interestingly, none of the consignment cases focused on the competi-
tive impact of the practices. Rather, they weighed the relative values or
rights of the parties, whether or not derived from common law property
concepts, to determine the legality of the resale price maintenance.
132
Although Simpson moved away from property concepts as a basis for
antitrust policy, it gained relatively little ground toward a competition
model of antitrust.
X. VERTICAL NON-PRICE RESTRAINTS
A. THE SCHWINN CASE
Although the law of non-price vertical restraints did not begin to de-
velop until the 1960s, restraint against alienation principles were initially
quite influential. The Supreme Court, after refusing to characterize verti-
cal non-price restraints as per se illegal in White Motor Co. v. United
States,' 33 squarely took on the issue in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co.' 34 There, the Court confronted the leading bicycle manufacturer's
distribution system in which distributors were assigned specific geo-
graphic areas and could only sell to franchised retailers.
The Court proceeded to pronounce a bright line, per se rule resting
squarely on common law alienation principles, holding that "it is unrea-
sonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine
131. Justice Douglas states that "it matters not what the coercive device is." 377 U.S. at
17. He does distinguish consignments of "rug[s] or a painting or other work of art to a
merchant or gallery for sale at a minimum price." Id. at 18; see William H. Page, Legal
Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMORY L.J. 1, 33 (1995). Lower federal
courts have managed to distinguish Simpson on the coercion issue, reaffirming the contin-
ued validity of General Electric. See, e.g., Mesirow v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 703 F.2d 339
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820 (1983).
132. Lower federal courts have espoused the continuing validity of General Electric.
See Illinois Corp. Travel v. American Airlines, 889 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1989); Kowalski v.
Chicago Tribune, 854 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1988); Ryko Mfg. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215
(8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988); Morrison v. Murray Biscuit, 797 F.2d
1430 (7th Cir. 1986).
133. 372 U.S. 253 (1963). The case had come to the Court on a motion for summary
judgment. A five-judge majority (one justice not participating) believed that a trial was
necessary to show whether such restraints were so inherently anticompetitive as to justify
the application of the per se rule.
134. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the manufac-
turer has parted with dominion over it.'135 Customer and territorial re-
straints where the manufacturer retained title over the goods, as through
consignment or agency, were to be judged under the rule of reason. 136
The Schwinn Court attempted to justify the distinction by reference to
the needed flexibility of the rule of reason so as not to "severely hamper
smaller enterprises resorting to reasonable methods of meeting the com-
petition of giants and of merchandising through independent dealers."'1 37
The Court made no mention of how the ownership of the goods should
affect the small competitors' ability to compete. Since ownership would
not appear to have any particular effect on a small manufacturer's ability
to compete, the Schwinn decision really does appear to rest only on alien-
ation principles.
The Schwinn Court examined the "Schwinn Plan," which accounted for
seventy-five percent of Schwinn's sales and involved no passage of title to
the distributors, and found it reasonable under the rule of reason.138 The
per se rule established in Schwinn based on passage of title, however,
resulted in a barrage of criticism both from lower courts, which attempted
to circumnavigate the applicability of the Schwinn precedent at every op-
portunity, 39 and from commentators.
140
135. Id. at 379. "But to allow this freedom where the manufacturer has parted with
dominion over the goods-the usual marketing situation-would violate the ancient rule
against restraints on alienation and open the door to exclusivity of outlets and limitation of
territory further than prudence permits." Id. at 380.
136. Id. at 381. The Dr. Miles case also involved a consignment arrangement between
manufacturer and dealer, yet the Court there treated the price agreements as if title to the
goods had passed to the dealers. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 398; see supra text accompanying
notes 59-60.
137. Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 380.
138. Id. at 381.
139. See, e.g., Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178, 1187 (10th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc. 472 F.2d 637, 640
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d
1374, 1379-80 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 936-38 (3d Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d
398, 406 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1968).
140. See, e.g., Donald I. Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times of Change: From White to
Schwinn to Where?, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (1975); William S. Comanor, Vertical Territorial
and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1419 (1968);
Richard W. McLaren, Territorial and Customer Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested Re-
tail Prices and Refusals to Deal, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 137 (1967); Almarin Phillips, Schwinn
Rules and the "New Economics" of Vertical Relations, 44 ANTrrRUsT L.J. 573 (1975); Earl
E. Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 595 (1968);
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted
Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REv.
282 (1975). For defenses to Schwinn, see LAwRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF ANTITRUST 405-06 (1977); Martin B. Louis, Vertical Distributional Restraints
Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argument for the Continuing Use of a Partial Per Se
Approach, 75 MICH. L. REV. 275 (1976).
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B. THE SYL VANA DECISION
In 1977, in the watershed Continental T. V. v. GTE Sylvania' 41 deci-
sion, the Supreme Court did what it rarely does, reversing itself and over-
ruling Schwinn. In so doing, the Court pronounced a rule of reason for
all non-price vertical restraints in which the benefits to interbrand compe-
tition are to be measured against the harms to intrabrand competition.
According to the Court, Schwinn had to be overruled because the passage
of title which was the basis for its per se proscription had no competitive
significance.1 42 Likely benefits to interbrand competition or harms to in-
trabrand competition bear no relationship to who owns the goods in a
given distribution system. The Court characterized Schwinn as "formalis-
tic line drawing.' 14
3
In a footnote, the Sylvania Court specifically rejected the relevance of
"the ancient rule against restraints on alienation."'1 44 The Court "quite
agree[d] with Mr. Justice Stewart's dissenting comment in Schwinn that
'the state of the common law 400 or even 100 years ago is irrelevant to
the issue before us: the effect of the antitrust laws upon vertical distribu-
tional restraints in the American economy today.""
'145
Even more damning was the Court's rejection of Judge Browning's in-
terpretation of Schwinn, dissenting below in the Ninth Circuit (which had
heard the Sylvania case en banc). According to Judge Browning,
Schwinn "reflect[ed] the view that the Sherman Act was intended to pro-
hibit restrictions on the autonomy of independent businessmen even
though they have no impact on 'price, quality, and quantity of goods and
services."1 4
6
The Court was "unable to accept" that view, which "is certainly not
explicit in Schwinn,"'147 a case in which the Court purported to look at the
market impact of Schwinn's distribution systems.148 According to the
Court, "[c]ompetitive economies have social and political as well as eco-
nomic advantages, but an antitrust policy divorced from market consider-
ations would lack any objective benchmarks." 49 Thus, Sylvania
effectively quashed any role that the rule against restraints on alienation
might play in the analysis of non-price vertical restraints.
141. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
142. "Nor is there even an assertion in the [Schwinn] opinion that the competitive im-
pact of vertical restrictions is significantly affected by the form of the transaction." Id. at
54.
143. Id. at 59.
144. Id. at 54 n.21.
145. Id. (quoting Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 392 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
146. Id. (quoting Schwinn, 537 F.2d at 1019 (Browning, J., dissenting)).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id; see also William B. Bohling, A Simplified Rule of Reason for Vertical Re-
straints: Integrating Social Goals, Economic Analysis, and Sylvania, 64 IOWA L. REV. 461
(1979); Kurt A. Strasser, Vertical Territorial Restrains After Sylvania: A Policy Analysis and
Proposed New Rule, 1977 DUKE L.J. 775.
1996]
SMU LAW REVIEW
Even so, Justice White's concurring opinion in Sylvania is noteworthy.
He would not have overruled Schwinn, but would have recognized "fail-
ing firm" and "new entrant" exceptions to the per se rule articulated
therein.'50 He took issue with the majority's characterization of
Schwinn's distinction between sale and non-sale transactions as an at-
tempt to measure the intrabrand harm and interbrand benefit of vertical
restraints. Rather, the distinction was made, according to Justice White,
in deference to "the notion in many of our cases involving vertical re-
straints that independent businessmen should have the freedom to dis-
pose of the goods they own as they see fit.' 15 1 Justice White pointed
specifically to the restraints on alienation underpinnings of the "Court's
seminal decision" in Dr. Miles.'
52
Although Justice White conceded that the majority might be "right in
partially abandoning" the restraints against alienation principle and in
evaluating non-price vertical restraints solely in terms of "their 'relevant
economic impact,"' he was concerned by the Court's "lightly reject[ing]"
those precedents. 153 He noted that the alienation "principle is without
question more deeply embedded in our cases than the notions ... bor-
rowed by the majority from the 'new economics of vertical
relationships.'"1
54
Justice White notwithstanding, antitrust law following Sylvania had dif-
ferent rules for vertical price and non-price restraints. The rule of reason
for non-price restraints was based on the Court's assessment of the likely
competitive benefits and harms arising from such activities. In articulat-
ing the rule, the Court soundly renounced the relevance of property right
notions. In contrast, vertical price fixing was still per se illegal even
though that rule did derive largely from the common law protection of
restraints against alienation and even though the Court had never really
undertaken any assessment of the competitive impact of resale price
maintenance.155
XI. THE DEALER TERMINATION CASES
The Supreme Court next tackled the world of vertical restraints in two
dealer termination cases, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. 156 and
150. 433 U.S. at 65 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
151. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 66-67.
152. Id. at 67.
153. Id. at 69.
154. Id. White commented, "The rationale of Schwinn is no doubt difficult to discern
from the opinion, and it may be wrong; it is not, however, the aberration the majority
makes it out to be here." Id.
155. Certainly, the same potential benefits to interbrand competition are present. Re-
sale price maintenance schemes are typically motivated by the manufacturer's desire to
gain and keep competitive advantages over rivals. Similarly, the impact on intrabrand
competition is negative, but not necessarily more negative than non-price restraints. Ex-
clusive location clauses or territorial divisions can, for example, eliminate all intrabrand
competition. Vertical price fixing without more eliminates only intrabrand price competi-
tion; non-price rivalry may still be present and important.
156. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
[Vol. 49
RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.157 In Monsanto,
the Court ruled that something more than mere dealer complaints to the
manufacturer is necessary to establish a price-fixing conspiracy, even
when the manufacturer subsequently terminates the suspected price cut-
ter.' 58 In so holding, the Court breathed new life into the Colgate doc-
trine, stating that a "manufacturer's strongly felt concern about resale
prices does not necessarily mean that it has done more than the Colgate
doctrine allows."'
1 59
According to the Monsanto Court, manufacturers and distributors have
legitimate reasons to communicate about price and marketing strategies
on a constant basis. The maintenance of resale prices may, from the man-
ufacturer's perspective, be part and parcel of agreed-upon non-price mar-
keting plans which require frequent monitoring. 160 Thus, the Court
concluded that to infer an agreement from the "highly ambiguous evi-
dence" of dealer complaints would be inappropriate and would erode the
protection afforded by Colgate.'
61
The Monsanto Court also noted that the distinctions between price and
non-price restraints and concerted and independent action are "in theory
... reasonably clear, [but] often they are difficult to apply in practice."'
1 62
The confusion arises because "the economic effect of all of the conduct
described above-unilateral and concerted vertical price setting, agree-
ments on price and nonprice restrictions-is in many, but not all, cases
similar or identical."'1 63 "And judged from a distance," the Court added,
"the conduct of the parties in the various situations can be indistinguish-
able." 164
Citing Parke, Davis, the Monsanto Court thus reaffirmed that the eco-
nomic impact is essentially the same for all vertical restrictions, whether
or not accompanied by agreement and whether or not involving price.
Different rules apply, although the economic effects are usually the same.
This divergence is due in large part to the Supreme Court's early ad-
herence to the restraint against alienation concept, its concomitant recog-
nition of the right of unilateral action in the vertical price arena, and its
later rejection of the alienation principle and focus on the actual eco-
nomic impact in the non-price areas. Continued refinement of what con-
stitutes an agreement has had the effect of revitalizing the Colgate
doctrine and enlarging the circumstances in which a manufacturer's resale
157. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
158. 465 U.S. at 763-64. The Court recognized that manufacturers and dealers have
legitimate reasons to discuss price and that to restrict the exchange of information between
the two would interfere with the normal operation of the market. Id. at 762, 764.
159. Id. at 763; see also Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983)
(manufacturer's suggested pricing system upheld despite widespread compliance by deal-
ers who otherwise would have charged less). See Andersen, supra note 66.
160. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762-63.
161. Id. at 763.
162. I& at 762.




price maintenance scheme, though effective, does not run afoul of the
Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court further explored the relationship of price and non-
price restraints and the agreement requirement in the Sharp Electronics
case. There, the Court ruled that an agreement between a manufacturer
and a dealer to terminate another price-cutting dealer is not per se illegal
absent an underlying agreement on price or price levels to be charged by
the complaining dealer.165 In so holding, the Court was wary of ex-
panding the per se rule into what were essentially a manufacturer's non-
price restrictions. 166
According to the Court, per se proscriptions of vertical restraints
"should be narrow" in scope because non-price restrictions are not overly
pernicious and often have procompetitive benefits. 167 As a result, the
Court stated "that there is a presumption in favor of a rule-of-reason
standard; that departure from that standard must be justified by demon-
strable economic effect ... rather than formalistic distinctions; [and] that
interbrand competition is the primary concern of the antitrust laws."'
1 68
The Sharp Electronics Court went on to acknowledge the common law
restraint on alienation foundation of the Dr. Miles decision. 169 But since
"[i]n the present case. . . no agreement on resale price or price level, and
hence no restraint on alienation, was found by the jury," the court found
that "the common law-rationale of Dr. Miles does not apply.
'170
Thus, the Sharp Electronics decision at once reaffirms the common law
underpinning of Dr. Miles while, at the same time, narrowing its reach.
While still good law, Dr. Miles is carefully limited to resale price mainte-
nance schemes where an agreement can be shown. Further, that agree-
ment must actually relate to maintaining a certain price and cannot be
inferred just from dealer complaints followed by termination of a sup-
posed price cutter.1
7'
The collective effect of Sharp Electronics and Monsanto, then, is to ex-
pand the practical reach of the Colgate doctrine. The restrictive approach
to what constitutes an agreement, the acknowledged bias for interbrand
competition, and the recognized blur between price and non-price re-
straints with the resulting "presumption in favor of a rule-of-reason stan-
dard" 72 certainly give a manufacturer far more latitude to affect the
165. Sharp Electronics, 485 U.S. at 731.
166. Id. at 724.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 726.
169. Id. at 733.
170. Id According to the Court, "[Pletitioner's principal contention ... is compelled
not by the old common law, but by our more recent Sherman Act precedents." Id. The
Court rejected the applicability of those precedents as well. Id. at 734.
171. In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 335 (1990), the
Court further restricted the practical reach of Dr. Miles by ruling that competitors of resale
price maintenance schemes do not have standing to bring private antitrust actions. See also
William L. Reynolds & Spencer W. Waller, Legal Process and the Past of Antitrust, 48 SMU
L. REv. 1811, 1821-22 (1995).
172. Sharp Electronics, 485 U.S. at 726.
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distribution of its products than the post-Colgate cases suggested. 173
The resulting limitation of the modern-day influence of Dr. Miles to
situations closely approximating its facts means that the vestiges of the
common law restraint on alienation are similarly restricted. The Sharp
Electronics Court does, however, recognize the common law property un-
derpinnings of Dr. Miles.
XII. CURRENT VERTICAL RESTRAINTS LAW
So what are we left with in the vertical restraints arena? Resale price
maintenance (vertical price fixing) is per se illegal because, in large part,
such activity violates the restraints on alienation principles of the com-
mon law.174 Vertical non-price restraints are judged under the rule of
reason because of potential benefits to interbrand competition; common
law property concepts were specifically found irrelevant. The Supreme
Court has nonetheless found that both price and non-price restraints have
the same economic consequences in the majority of instances.
That economic impact is present whether a manufacturer's downstream
restrictions are pursuant to an agreement or simply adhered to by its
dealers. Yet the Court has in recent years expanded upon a manufac-
turer's permissible behavior by restricting what constitutes an agreement.
The principles of Colgate, once thought nearly extinct, have flourished,
while the autonomy of distributors, thought important in Dr. Miles, has
diminished.
Given the Court's emphasis on the economic impact of vertical re-
straints, an approach that is difficult to quarrel with, should it simply
overrule Dr. Miles as it did Schwinn? If the economic effects of vertical
price and non-price restraints are generally comparable, the rule of rea-
son would seem appropriate, particularly if both have the potential to
enhance interbrand competition.
Further, the abandonment of Dr. Miles would presumably eliminate
the last vestiges of common law property concepts in modern-day anti-
trust law.175 The Court would no longer be in the position of grudgingly
accepting the restraint on alienation justification for Dr. Miles which it
rejected in Schwinn. Instead of laboring mightily to limit the reach of the
per se rule for resale price maintenance, the Court could focus purely on
the economic effect of a given scheme under the rule of reason.176 The
173. See supra text accompanying notes 97-117.
174. The economic justification for the per se rule for vertical price fixing recognized in
Sylvania was that it could "facilitate cartelizing" between manufacturers by reducing their
incentive to cheat on an existing cartel. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.18 (quoting Posner,
supra note 140, at 294).
175. See Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263,
295-96 ("[E]xercise of the common law device of retaining title in goods forestalled the
operation of competition policy. This property right by retained title, which predates the
Sherman Act by several centuries, insulated owners from liability for otherwise illegal re-
sale price maintenance for seventy-five years.").
176. This would entail balancing the benefits to interbrand competition against the
harm to intrabrand competition as under Sylvania. Since the Court has stated that inter-
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question of what constitutes a price fixing agreement between manufac-
turer and distributor would be of less importance if the per se proscrip-
tion did not lurk behind the finding of an agreement.
The continuing efficacy of the Dr. Miles decision notwithstanding, it is
certain that the judiciary has marginalized the relevance of restraints on
alienation in contemporary antitrust jurisprudence. Even with the lan-
guage in Sharp Electronics dutifully acknowledging the common law ori-
gins of the prohibition of vertical price fixing, restraints on alienation are
seldom raised in modern antitrust litigation. When raised, the courts
have had little difficulty disposing of the issue.
177
Given the marginalization of restraints on alienation, the Supreme
Court's confinement of the per se rule for vertical price fixing, and the
likely political turmoil that the reversal of Dr. Miles would cause, 178 it is
perhaps unnecessary for the Court to venture that far. Better symmetry
in the law of vertical restraints could be achieved, however, without the
common law antecedents of the Dr. Miles decision.
But what of Colgate? The constriction of Dr. Miles and focus on the
actual economic effects of vertical relationships have corresponded with
the resurgence of Colgate protections for manufacturer distribution deci-
sions. If, as suggested earlier, 179 Colgate was in reality a compromise be-
tween competing manufacturer and dealer interests, where does that
compromise stand now?
. As noted, Colgate tied a manufacturer's authority over its goods not to
ownership, but to the lack of formal agreement over price or other distri-
bution restrictions. Since ownership of the goods distributed did not con-
trol, Colgate is not a restraint on alienation case, although it arguably
comes close. It recognizes the right of a manufacturer to exercise control
over its products to the point of actual agreement with a distributor,
which restrains trade.
Fundamental to the Dr. Miles decision were both the existence of an
agreement to fix resale prices and the distributor's ownership of the
brand competition "is the primary concern of the antitrust laws," most resale price mainte-
nance practices would be found to be reasonable unless implemented by a manufacturer
with a dominant market share. Sharp Electronics, 485 U.S. at 726.
177. See, e.g., Dawson v. W. & H. Voortman, Ltd., 864 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. I11. 1994);
Electronic Lab. Supply Co., Inc., v. Motorola, Inc., 1989 WL 113127 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20,
1989). Restraint on alienation issues apart from antitrust claims have arisen in cases in-
volving the brokerage of frequent flyer coupons. See TransWorld Airlines, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Coupon Exchange, Inc., 913 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1990); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. The
Ticket Exchange, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 976 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
178. The overruling of Dr. Miles would likely create a strong political backlash from the
small business lobby to Congress. In 1991, the House of Representatives passed H.R.
1470, which would have reversed the effects of Monsanto and Sharp Electronics and ex-
tended the reach of the per se rule for manufacturers' attempts to impose resale price
maintenance schemes. H.R. 1470, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). However, the measure
failed to get through the Senate in the face of a promised presidential veto. See generally
Dennis 0. Doherty, Note, Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.: Mon-
santo's Progeny and the Congressional Proposal to Codify the Per Se Rule Against Vertical
Price Fixing, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 963 (1989).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
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goods. 18 0 The notion of what could constitute an agreement or a conspir-
acy for Sherman Act purposes expanded considerably in later years,18'
and the authority of manufacturers to control distribution of its products
under Colgate waned significantly.'3 2 This restriction of Colgate was no
doubt influenced by judicial thought that vertical price fixing was inher-
ently anticompetitive and should be curtailed whenever possible.
In contrast, contemporary antitrust has focused solely on the economic
consequences of vertical activity and has questioned earlier presumptions
about its competitive impact. The Supreme Court has given priority to
interbrand competition and has recognized, first in Sylvania, that vertical
restrictions imposed by manufacturers can enhance interbrand competi-
tion.'83 Then, in Sharp Electronics, the Court stated its preference for the
rule of reason for vertical restraints and urged caution in the formalistic
use of the per se rule for "vertical restraints that contain the word 'price'
or that affect the 'prices' charged by dealers"' 84 to avoid restricting con-
duct which could enhance interbrand competition.
As noted, the Court has chosen not to overrule Dr. Miles but has re-
stricted the notion of agreement in the vertical price context.185 As a
result, the pendulum has swung to favor manufacturer interests over
those of distributors. The compromise effected by Colgate on dealers'
autonomy, first established in Dr. Miles, has shifted away from that au-
tonomy after years in which the Court's expansive treatment of what con-
stitutes an agreement had all but eradicated the manufacturer's ability to
control distribution of its goods.
But the shift of the balance of power between manufacturer and dis-
tributor has had little, if anything, to do with common law property rights
or notions of control or autonomy. Rather, it has had everything to do
with modern beliefs about the desirable and undesirable economic conse-
quences of vertical distribution strategies. The pronounced focus on, and
recognition of, the benefits of vertical restraints to interbrand competi-
tion since Sylvania has effectively caused the shift of prerogative to the
manufacturer. Vertical restraints, including those involving price, are
simply no longer regarded as necessarily pernicious to competition. It is
common understanding that the anticompetitive consequences of success-
fully imposed manufacturer distribution restrictions are the same whether
180. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 373, 408. Even though the resale price agreements were
apparently for drugs resold through consignment arrangements, the Court finessed the
ownership issue and clearly viewed ownership as resting with the distributors. See id. at
397-98; see also supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
181. See supra note 88.
182. The constriction of Colgate continued at least through Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 29.
See supra text accompanying notes 97-117.
183. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52.
184. 485 U.S. at 728. According to the Court, vertical non-price restraints reduce in-
trabrand competition as well so as to encourage dealers to provide services to enhance
interbrand competition. Id.
185. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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accomplished through express or implied agreement or "suggestion."' 186
Colgate in effect "tolerated" that result absent an agreement because of
that Court's recognition of a manufacturer's "right... freely to exercise
his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal."'
1 87
The Colgate "right" fell into disfavor and was quite narrowly construed
as long as resale price maintenance was regarded as a true competitive
evil. The new economic learning has, in effect, reversed that presump-
tion, narrowed the reach of the per se rule, and expanded the influence of
Colgate. It is now decidedly more difficult to find the existence of an
agreement where a manufacturer's imposed price is at issue.
XIII. CONCLUSION
As the pendulum between Dr. Miles and Colgate has swung back to-
wards Colgate, ownership and control prerogatives, once fundamental to
the accommodation of manufacturer and distributor interests, have all
but disappeared. Protection of restraints against alienation as an antitrust
policy, dealt a near mortal wound in the Sylvania decision, is now sure to
die of neglect.
Although property rights were part of the foundation of antitrust, their
protection is simply incompatible with an antitrust policy that focuses on
economic impact. Sylvania certainly establishes the fallacy of reliance on
the concept of title as a guide to measuring the competitive effect of dis-
tribution systems. Contemporary antitrust policy should concentrate
neutrally on competition and not competitors. In a country of consumers
as well as competitors, surely we are better off as a result.
186. See Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 44, for this observation:
True, there results the same economic effect as is accomplished by a prohib-
ited combination to suppress price competition if each customer, although
induced to do so solely by a manufacturer's announced policy, independently
decides to observe specified resale prices. So long as Colgate is not over-
ruled, this result is tolerated ....
187. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307.
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